The remote authentication has been advancing with the growth of online services being offered on remote basis. This calls for an optimal authentication framework other than single-server authentication. In this connection, the multi-server authentication architecture has been introduced in the literature that enables the users to avail variety of services of various service providers, using a single pair of identity and password. Lately, we have witnessed a few multi-server authentication protocols in the literature that had several limitations. One of those multi-server authentication protocols has been put forward by Chang et al. recently. Our analysis shows that the Chang et al.'s scheme is susceptible to impersonation threat, stolen smart card threat. In this study, we have reviewed the protocol thoroughly, and proposed an improved model, that is resistant to all known and identified threats. The formal security analysis along with discussion of informal analysis for contributed model is also presented in this study, besides performance and its evaluation analysis.
Introduction
The growth of internet has facilitated the day-today introduction of new services on remote basis. In this regard, an efficient Multi-Server Authentication (MSA) serves as an integral component of this growth, which lets the users avail remote services from different servers, by utilizing a single pair of identity and password for all servers [10, 21, 29, 33] . MSA not only relieves the user of the hassle of memorizing so many passwords, but also relaxes the servers of individualized registration procedures with each user, prior to the authentication phase [17] . In the last five years, many multi-server authentication schemes were presented. Nevertheless, there is still a need of more secure and efficient techniques [35] . In MSA literature, for neural networks, Li et al. [23] , Lin et al. [30] , Juang [18] , Chang and Lee [3] contributed few techniques that were based on symmetric cryptography and discrete logarithms. However, these schemes did not protect the identity of user, and were also computationally inefficient for their operations cost. Afterwards, Liao and Wang [28] presented a dynamic identity-based MSA protocol. However, the scheme was found vulnerable by Hsiang and Shih [9] , for lacking mutual authentication, and improved scheme was presented by Hsiang and Shih. Then, Yeh et al. [36] found that the previous scheme is exposed to session key disclosure, replay threat, and forgery threat. Thereafter, Lee et al. [22] indicated that Yeh et al.'s scheme is prone to masquerading attack and also lacks mutual authentication. At the same time, Sood et al. [34] specifies that the same Yeh et al. protocol suffers stolen smart card, impersonation threat, and a flawed password changing procedure. Sood et al. and Lee et al. also demonstrated their enhanced models. Then, Li et al. [24, 27 ] discovered a mutual authentication weakness in Sood et al. protocol, and server spoofing, faulty authentication procedure in Lee et al.'s scheme [22] , with contribution of improved schemes, respectively. Afterwards, Chang et al. [5] proposed a dynamic identity based authentication scheme, which was found to be vulnerable in impersonation threat, stolen smart card threat, insider threat, and password-guessing threat by Li et al. [26] . The Li et al. [24] protocol was found to be vulnerable against forgery attack by Chang et al. [4] and an inherent design weakness was discovered by Chang et al. that was providing the attacker a chance to perform illegal activities without being caught. Thereafter, Chang et al. put forward an enhanced model for protocol [24] . After careful study of Chang et al. [4] , we found that the Chang et al.'s model is prone to impersonation threat, and session key disclosure attacks, once smart card gets stolen. We have contributed an enhanced biometric authentication model that covers all of the indicated limitations in the Chang et al. scheme. This study work demonstrates formal analysis of security and performance evaluation as well. Our protocol is arranged in the following order: The section "Preliminaries" defines the preliminaries related to our scheme and section "A review of the Chang et al. ' s protocol" presents a review and cryptanalysis of Chang et al.'s protocol. The section "Proposed model" demonstrates our contributed protocol. The section "Security discussion" and section "Formal security analysis" illustrate informal and formal security analysis, respectively. The "Comparison and performance analysis" section depicts the related performance analysis. The last section summarizes this paper.
Bio-hashing
The bio-hashing function [19] is employed for capturing the inherent biometric features of a person, such as fingerprint to be used for authentication purpose, while these features remains permanent over a period of time. Jin et al. [16] , in 2004 came up with a two-factor authenticator protocol which bears iterated inner products, as kept between tokenized pseudorandom number and user-oriented finger impression-based features. This procedure computes a particular compact code which provides the basis for the current bio-hashing concept. Thereafter, this bio-hashing function was improved further by Lumini and Loris [32] . The bio-hashing function produces a unique random vector as a function of specific user's biometric features, which is named as a Biocode. This, in addition, helps in discretizing the projection-coefficients and is computed as secure hashed password in general.
A Review of the Chang et al.'s Scheme
The protocol's working of Chang et al. [4] is described as under.
Revisiting Chang et al.'s Model
The Chang et al.'s model [4] is comprised of three procedures, such as the registration procedure, mutual authentication procedure which is also shown in Figure 1. We present a few notations that may be helpful to readers to comprehend the scheme as given in Table 1 . 
Server Registration Procedure
The Chang et al.'s model comprises a reliable registration centre (RC) along with n number of servers (SPj), while the range of j implies 1 ≤ j ≤ n. The SPj completes its registration procedure with RC before the user's registration. The SPj is registered from RC with the sharing of two secrets K 1 and K 2 between SPj and RC over a confidential channel. Earlier, RC selects a master secret key k and a random integer b. Afterwards, SPj submits the identity SIDj towards registration centre. Then, RC calculates K 1 = h(k || b) and K 2 = h(SIDj || H(b)). Here, H(.) is a private hash digest, while h(.) represents public hash-digest function. Onwards, the registration centre forwards these keys to SPj employing a confidential channel. The SPj completes its registration procedure with RC before the user's registration. The SPj is registered from RC with the sharing of two secrets K1 and K2 between SPj and RC over a confidential channel. Earlier, RC selects a master secret key k Ui receives SC and stores safely.
User Registration Procedure
In the registration procedure, Ui performs few registration steps with the RC. Afterwards Ui may access all service providers SPj. The RC performs the undermentioned steps with the user to implement the registration procedure.
Cryptanalysis of Chang et al.'s Protocol
The 
Proposed Scheme
Our proposed model is based on countering the limitations in Chang et al.'s model. The contributed model comprises service provider (server's) registration procedure, user's registration procedure, mutual authentication procedure, and password upgrading procedure.
Server Registration Procedure
The proposed model comprises a trustworthy RC and n number of servers (SPj), while the range of j implies 1 ≤ j ≤ n. The SPj performs the registration with RC prior to user's registration procedure, using a secret channel. During initialization process, RC selects a master secret key k, and also chooses a random secret b. Then, SPj forwards its identity SIDj towards registration centre. Next, RC computes the two keys as K 1 =h(k || b) and K 2 = h(SIDj || H(b)), and sends both keys (K 1 and K 2 ) to SPj employing a confidential channel. In this manner, the SPj gets registered through RC.
User Registration Procedure
In registration phase, Ui registers with registration centre (RC) and follows the under-mentioned steps: Wi=h(IDi | |k), Xi=h(IDi || H(b)), Yi = h(Wi || h(k || b)) Ri=Yi ⊕ MPi , and Zi = Wi ⊕ h(k||b) ⊕ H(b) ⊕ MPi, and stores IDi and Wi in its database, while Wi is sent to all SPj in the network. Next, RC issues smart card to Ui with these parameters {Vi, Xi, Ri, Zi and h()}.
Mutual Authentication Procedure
In this stage, the user is mutually authenticated with server SPj and uses smart card to avail services. The related procedure is shown in Figure 2 . 
Password Updating Procedure
Ui modifies his/her old password (PWi) with a fresh password (PWi fr ) without involving RC, by adopting the under-mentioned steps:
1 To modify the password, the user would input his/ her identity as IDi, old password as PWi into the smart card. Next, the user imprints biometric identity Bi into a device scanner. 
Security Discussion
This segment illustrates the informal security discussion for contributed model in comparison with Chang et al.'s model.
Replay Attacks
These attacks may be attempted by an attacker after replaying the seized message contents at opportune time to deceive any legal entity of the protocol. 
Man-In-The-Middle-Attack
In this threat, the attacker intrudes between the legal participants by acting as an intermediary through replaying or modifying the message contents. A successful attack may let the legitimate members communicate with the adversary perceiving it as a right participant [6] .
An adversary cannot construct the message {Auth 2 , m 2 } in request of {Aij, m 2 , Auth 1 }, since the construction of Auth 2 requires Yi, which is inaccessible to Ⱥ from either intercepted messages or SC contents. Then, Ⱥ constructs a valid Auth 3 against SPj's challenge {Auth 2 , m 2 }, as Tidi is inaccessible to Ⱥ due to unknown Yi. Therefore, the contributed scheme is protected from MiTM threat.
Modification Threats
Such threats could be initiated by an attacker if it transforms the communication message illegally for submitting it to any valid participant [19] .
An adversary may attempt to construct the message {Aij, m 2 , Auth 1 }, however it may not be able to do so, since it needs the parameter Aij, that further requires the knowledge of PWi and Bi as Aij = Zi ⊕ h(h(SIDj || PK) || ni) ⊕ h(H B (Bi) || PWi) ⊕ PK. Likewise, it requires Tidi to construct Auth 1 , which requires the knowledge of Yi, which is also inaccessible to Ⱥ due to the unreachable MPi. Similarly, an adversary is not able to construct the message {Auth 2 , m 2 } in request of {Aij, m 2 , Auth 1 }, given that the production of Auth 2 requires the information of Yi, which is not accessible to Ⱥ either from intercepted messages or stolen SC contents.
Password or Secret Guessing Threat
An attacker Ⱥ might try to recover password PWi either from messages intercepted or from stolen smart card contents. The password guessing requires the attacker 
Session Key Security
This trait makes certain that the established session key is merely known to lawful members of a session, i.e. client and service provider.
In proposed model, the agreed session key, i.e. Sk = h(Tidi || ni || nj || SIDj) is secure, since, the Tidi calculation requires the access of Yi, i.e., Tidi=h(Yi || SIDj || ni), while Yi requires the value MPi for guessing it, as Yi=Ri ⊕ MPi. Hence, the session key Sk has been safe, in case the SC contents are accessed or Ⱥ intercepts the public parameters.
Known Key Security
This attribute makes certain the protection of private keys of participants in case the current session key is exposed.
In contributed protocol, even if the adversary accesses the values Sk, Ri, an attacker cannot recover user password PWi, since the PWi recovery from Sk = h(Tidi || ni || nj || SIDj) requires calculation of Yi=Ri ⊕ MPi and Tidi=h(Yi || SIDj || ni). This is not possible due to the inaccessibility of Bi in MPi=h(H B (Bi) || PWi). At the same time, the server secret K is also secure as it is existent in a function i.e h(K || b) and is hard be guessed in polynomial amount of time. Therefore, the proposed protocol keeps the feature of known key security.
Mutual Authentication
This attribute assures that the concerned members authenticate one another in the protocol session and construct a mutual session key ultimately [7] .
In our scheme, both of the participants authenticate each other mutually on account of Tidi and Yi' parameters. The server authenticates the user only if Tidi is valid in Auth 3 , and this Tidi cannot be constructed by an attacker. Similarly, Ui authenticates SPj on account Yi' parameter used by server in the construction of Auth 2 = h(Yi' || SIDj || ni' || nj ). The Yi parameter cannot be accessed by an attacker even through Ri if the card gets stolen. Therefore, our protocol assures mutual authentication feature to the legitimate participants.
Anonymous Protocol
In an anonymous protocol [11, 12, 15] , a legal user interacts with service provider without exposing its identity and an adversary may not recover the user's identity or secret credentials from intercepted contents on public channel.
In proposed scheme, the adversary cannot extract Ui's identity or other secret credentials out of intercepted contents on public channel or stolen smart card contents. This is because of the fact that the identity IDi is protected in a secret function Wi =h(IDi ||K), which is not possible to guess until the server secret K is exposed. Therefore, the contributed scheme confers anonymity to the user.
Formal Security Analysis
In this section, we exhibit the security strength of our protocol using formal analysis based on Burrows Aba-di Needham-logic (BAN) [2] and random oracle model-based analysis. The BAN logic proves the authenticated key agreement based on key distribution and mutual key agreement, and protocol robustness against the revelation of session key. We utilized few notations in this BAN logic proof as follows:
The agents interacting in a protocol are termed as principals The symmetric encryption is performed using keys in a protocol. Nonces in the protocol assist to distinguish various sessions.
We employed the following notations in proving the authenticity of our protocol using BAN logic:
The principal β believes ϱ, β ⊲ ϱ: β sees ϱ. β |~ ϱ: β once said ϱ. β ⇒ ϱ: β has got jurisdiction over ϱ.
The message ϱ is fresh.
(ϱ, ϱ'): ϱ or ϱ' are parts of message (ϱ, ϱ'). ⟨ ϱ⟩ ϱ' : The message ϱ is combined with ϱ'. P5. Belief postulate≈
P6. Session keys postulate≈
The contributed scheme must meet the undermentioned goals to prove its session key's security under BAN logic on the basis of above postulates: To proceed, we convert the exchanged messages in our scheme into idealized form as given below:
Currently, the idealized forms such as M 2 , M 2 and M 3 of our scheme may be analyzed and seen in the light of stated assumptions and postulates. To proceed, we convert the exchanged messages in our scheme into idealized form as given below:
Currently, the idealized forms such as M2, M2 and M3 of our scheme may be analyzed and seen in the light of stated assumptions and postulates. Referring to 7, Υ4 and message-meaning postulate, P5. Belief postulate≈
The contributed scheme must meet the undermentioned goals to prove its session key's security under BAN logic on the basis of above postulates: Referring to 7, Υ4 and message-meaning postulate, P5. Belief postulate≈
The contributed scheme must meet the undermentioned goals to prove its session key's security under BAN logic on the basis of above postulates: Using the seeing rule, we have
Referring to 7, Υ4 and message-meaning P5. Belief postulate≈
The contributed scheme must meet the undermentioned goals to prove its session key's security under BAN logic on the basis of above postulates: The contributed scheme must meet the under-mentioned goals to prove its session key's security under BAN logic on the basis of above postulates: Besides, the understated assumptions are established for proving security of our scheme: (Goal-3) The stated BAN logic-based protocol examination establishes the fact that our model confers mutual authentication and the constructed session key (SK) is mutually established among the user U r and server S r . Employing the random oracle model, we implement a formal security analysis for proving that our protocol is quite secure [29] . For the said objective, we employed the oracle Reveal_oracle as described below: Reveal_oracle: This oracle would output x from the related hash digest y=h(x), for sure.
The Reveal_oracle has been employed in Algorithm 1, The stated BAN logic-based protocol examination establishes the fact that our model confers mutual authentication and the constructed session key (SK) is mutually established among the user Ur and server Sr.
Employing the random oracle model, we implement a formal security analysis for proving that our protocol is quite secure [29] . For the said objective, we employed the oracle _oracle as described below:
_oracle: This oracle would output x from the related hash digest y=h(x), for sure. The _oracle has been employed in Algorithm 1,
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, as shown above, signifying towards the session key's disclosure if the _oracle is executed by inverting hash digest. ], having execution delay time tm2 and Reveal-query qRy1 maximized on the adversary Ⱥ [1] . We regard our contributed scheme as quite safe against an adversary Ⱥ in recovering the agreed session key (SK) between Ui and SPj, if ������� ���� (tm2, qRy1 ) ≤ for a negligibly small > 0. In relation to this experiment, if the adversary is competent to invert a one-way hash digest function h(), it might comfortably recover the real session key (SK) shared between SPj and Ui, and at last Ⱥ wins the game. Nonetheless, in accordance with _oracle definition, this is polynomially unfeasible to invert hash function since ������� ���� and ������� ���� (t1) ≤ for a negligibly small value, i.e. > 0. Therefore, the contributed protocol may be safely considered as resistant as the security features for hash functions are tough to break in polynomial amount of time.
Comparison and Performance Analysis
The Chang et al. model presents a multi-server authenticated key agreement protocol and is based on light-weight symmetric key operations which are suitable for power deficient mobile devices. In this performance section, we evaluate performance efficiency of authentication protocol by Chang et al. with proposed protocol. The stated BAN logic-based protocol examination establishes the fact that our model confers mutual authentication and the constructed session key (SK) is mutually established among the user Ur and server Sr.
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The Chang et al. model presents a multi-server authenticated key agreement protocol and is based on light-weight symmetric key operations which are suitable for power deficient mobile devices. In this performance section, we evaluate performance efficiency of authentication protocol by Chang et al. with proposed protocol. Proof. In this proof [6, 8, [13] [14] , an adversary Ⱥ, competent enough to derive the agreed session key (SK) among the participants particularly Ui and SPj, makes a use of this Reveal_oracle oracle to implement Regarding Υ5, 11, and Jurisdiction postulate, we have 12: Ur |≡ Sr
The stated BAN logic-based protocol examination establishes the fact that our model confers mutual authentication and the constructed session key (SK) is mutually established among the user Ur and server Sr.
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. The probability of success corresponding to 1 is Sucs1=Prb.2 [ 1 =1]-1, Here Prb[E] depicts the event probability for an event (E). The advantage function for the above experiment can be established as (tm2, qRy1)=maxA [ 1 ] , having execution delay time tm2 and Reveal-query qRy1 maximized on the adversary Ⱥ [1] . We regard our contributed scheme as quite safe against an adversary Ⱥ in recovering the agreed session key (SK) between Ui and SPj, if (tm2, qRy1 ) ≤ for a negligibly small > 0. In relation to this experiment, if the adversary is competent to invert a one-way hash digest function h(), it might comfortably recover the real session key (SK) shared between SPj and Ui, and at last Ⱥ wins the game. Nonetheless, in accordance with _oracle definition, this is polynomially unfeasible to invert hash function since and (t1) ≤ for a negligibly small value, i.e. > 0. Therefore, the contributed protocol may be safely considered as resistant as the security features for hash functions are tough to break in polynomial amount of time.
Comparison and Performance Analysis
The Chang et al. model presents a multi-server authenticated key agreement protocol and is based on light-weight symmetric key operations which are suitable for power deficient mobile devices. In this performance section, we evaluate performance efficiency of authentication protocol by Chang et al. with proposed protocol. Table 2 lists the limitations of Chang et al.'s model, while the proposed scheme acts as a vigorous authentication protocol as proven in the preceding sections. Table (t 1 ) ≤ ε for a negligibly small value, i.e. ε > 0. Therefore, the contributed protocol may be safely considered as resistant as the security features for hash functions are tough to break in polynomial amount of time.
The Chang et al. model presents a multi-server authenticated key agreement protocol and is based on light-weight symmetric key operations which are suitable for power deficient mobile devices. In this performance section, we evaluate performance efficiency of authentication protocol by Chang et al. with proposed protocol. key security, while the proposed scheme is immune to those identified threats as verified in the formal security models. The actual cost for both schemes is shown in Table 3 , where different hash operations are represented with T H , and bypassing exclusive-OR operation for its insignificant computational cost.
Consequently, in consideration of above performance evaluation and analysis, we may infer that our protocol is more secure than Chang et al.'s protocol while bearing an equivalent cost. The proposed scheme provides immunity against impersonation and session key attacks in contrary to Chang et al.'s model. Table  3 compares the number of operations for Chang et al. protocol and contributed model and depicts that the phases of both schemes take an equivalent computational cost with a little variation in the cost of password modification phase.
Conclusion
The multi-server authentication serves as one of the main requirements of the current internet-based authentication framework. This manuscript studies the multi-server based Chang et al.'s remote authentication model which demonstrates that the Chang et al. scheme is prone to impersonation and session key attacks, subject to the stolen contents of smart card. The review and cryptanalysis of Chang et al. ' s model has been demonstrated comprehensively. Thereafter, a proposed model is presented that foils those particular attacks with the contribution of an enhanced model. Moreover, this paper presents the formal security analysis using BAN logic and random oracle model, and evaluates the performance against the Chang et al.'s protocol.
